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1 Introduction
The competition among colleges to attract high quality students has led to
the adoption of early admission programs over the last five decades, and
turned the college admission process into a complicated ‘admission game’ in
the United States.1 Today the most prominent colleges offer a choice over
a variety of admission programs: ‘early action’, ‘restrictive early action’,
’single-choice early action’, ‘early decision (I and II)’, and ‘regular decision’.
According to the 2019 State of College Admissions Report of the National
Association for College Admission Counseling (NACAC), twenty-five percent
of the respondents taking the Admission Trends Survey2 offered early deci-
sion (ED) plan while about thirty-eight percent offered early action (EA)
plan. These figures are much higher for private institutions, and for selective
colleges.3 While EA presents a student a chance to gain an admission deci-
sion in advance of the Regular Decision (RD) date without a commitment
to attend, ED requires the student to apply early to only one college and
matriculate if admitted. EA and ED programs usually require high school
seniors to apply near November with a decision by late December. RD of-
fers a later application deadline (January 1) and time to decide whether to
matriculate until May 1.4
The literature on college admissions offers various arguments to explain
why colleges use ED programs and students prefer to apply to it. Colleges,
1The Early Admissions Game (Avery, et al., 2003) is the seminal empirical study of
the effects of early admission policies in the US.
2The survey response rate was 35 percent.
3While only 5 percent of public institutions offered ED programs, this ratio goes up to
37 percent for private colleges. Fifty-six percent of the selective colleges (those accepting
fewer than 50 percent of applicants) offered an ED plan. Forty-six percent of colleges with
yield rates lower than 30 percent used EA plan. (See ‘State of College Admission 2019 at
http://www.nacacnet.org.)
4Refer to the 2018-2019 Admission Trends Survey of NACAC, available at
http://www.nacacnet.org, for a detailed description of each type of early admission pro-
gram.
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in particular lower-ranked ones, may use ED to attract the desired students
in restricted application pools in order to mitigate the competition in RD
and manage the enrollment uncertainty (Chen et al., 2018).5 ED programs
may provide the student to signal her enthusiasm about a particular college,
(Avery and Levine, 2010). Colleges may use ED programs as a screening
device to avoid the winner’s curse (Lee, 2009; Kim, 2010; Chapman and
Dickert-Conlin, 2012).
2018-2019 Admission Trends Survey of NACAC also reports that between
Fall 2017 and Fall 2018, there was an average increase of 11 percent in the
number of ED applicants. Students prefer to apply early if the chance to
be admitted is higher at ED than RD. Lee (2009) shows that ED results in
lower admission standards than in RD, and that ED may increase allocative
efficiency. Using the data from two liberal arts school, Chapman and Dickert-
Conlin (2012) finds the evidence that applying ED raises the probability of
acceptance by 40 percentage points. Considering need-blind colleges, Kim
(2010) finds that while ED programs benefit the lower ability full-pay and
higher ability financial aid students, they are detrimental to lower ability
financial aid students. In contrast, Murra-Anton (2019) shows that low-
income students are strictly better off when early admissions are allowed.
Despite its advantages, colleges have had an unsteady engagement with
ED, which can be seen as corroborating evidence of the so called early admis-
sion game. In April of 2002, following the announcement of Yale University’s
president Richard Levine to drop their ED policy, the University of North
Carolina at Chapel Hill became the first major selective college to abandon
ED admissions. By November 2002, Yale and Stanford switched from ED to
EA programs. In 2007-2008, Harvard and Princeton had eliminated the early
admissions programs entirely. Nevertheless, after 2011, Harvard, Princeton,
Stanford and Yale resumed single-choice EA.
5According to the 2018-2019 Admission Trends Survey of NACAC, colleges with lower
total yield rates tended to admit a greater percentage of their ED applicants compared to
those with higher yield rates.
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In this paper we study strategic issues in regard to ED in a centralized
college admissions model, by extending the one-period many-to-one matching
model of Gale and Shapley (1962) to a two-period model with early and
regular decision markets. Our model involves two finite and disjoint sets of
individuals, colleges and students. Each college has a finite capacity that
limits the number of students that it can accept in the two periods, and
each student can enroll to at most one school during the whole matching
process.6 In the RD period, each college has a preference relation over the
possible subsets of students which is responsive to its preference over the set
of students and each student has a preference relation over the set of colleges
and being unmatched. The capacities of colleges together with the preference
profiles of colleges and students in the RD period constitute a regular RD
market.
In the ED period, each college announces out of its total capacity an ED
quota, which it aims to fill with respect to its ED preference ordering. This
ordering is responsive to some restriction of its RD preference ordering on a
subset of students. On the other side of the market, each student has an ED
preference ordering which is a restriction of his or her RD preference ordering
on a singleton subset of colleges. The quotas of colleges together with the
preference profiles of colleges and students in the ED period define an ED
market. Clearly, for each RD market, there is a set of induced ED markets.
An allocation in the ED market is a many-to-one ED matching where
no college is assigned more students than its ED quota and no student is
assigned more than one college. Given a binding ED matching, an allocation
in the RD market is a many-to-one RD matching where all the assignments
realized in the ED market are preserved, no college is assigned more students
than its overall capacity and no student is assigned more than one college.
We assume that any student rejected from a college in the ED market can
6Many colleges and universities have priority categories for athletes, alumni children,
and minorities. We assume that the capacity of each college in our model is net of its
priority quota.
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still apply to the same college in the RD market.7
A matching in the ED market is stable if no student prefers remaining
unassigned to his or her assignment, no college prefers having a student slot
vacant rather than filling it with one of its assignments, and there exists
no unmatched college-student pair such that the college prefers the student
to one of its assignments or keeping a vacant slot (if any) or the student
prefers the college to his or her assignment. Given a matching realized in
the ED market, a matching in the RD market is stable if no student having
a regular assignment prefers remaining unassigned to his or her assignment,
no college prefers having a regularly assigned student slot vacant rather than
filling it with one of its regular assignments, and there exists no unmatched
college-student pair such that the college prefers the student to one of its
regular assignments or keeping a vacant slot (if any) or the student prefers
the college to his or her regular assignment.
An ED matching rule selects a matching for every ED market, and is
stable if it always selects a stable matching. A RD matching rule selects
a matching for every RD market, given any matching in any ED market
induced by the associated RD market. A RD matching rule is stable at an
ED matching rule if it always selects a stable matching, given any realization
of the ED matching rule applied to any ED market that is induced by the
RD market.
An ED matching rule and an RD matching rule as an ordered pair form
a matching system. A matching system is stable if it involves a stable ED
matching rule at which the RD matching rule within the system is also stable.
We study manipulation of a matching system via ED quotas and prefer-
ences, and show that there is no matching system that is stable and nonma-
nipulable by colleges or students.
Our results can be related to those in the literature dealing with manipula-
7As pointed out by Avery et.al. (2003), “...historically most colleges rejected 5 percent
or fewer of their early applicants in December. Some, such as Cornell, Georgetown, MIT,
and Tufts, have automatically deferred to the regular pool all early applicants who are not
admitted in December.”
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tion of preferences under two-sided matching in a single-period. Roth (1982)
shows that there is no stable matching rule which is immune to preference
manipulation. Mongell and Roth (1991) report a high percentage of trun-
cated preference profiles (single alternative preference) submitted in sorority
rush. Roth and Vande Vate (1991) show that in a decentralized one-to-one
matching with random matching process, for any strategies of the other play-
ers, each player will always have a truncation strategy as a best response.
Roth and Rothblum (1999) introduce the truncation of the true preferences
as a potentially profitable strategic behavior, instead of changing the order of
true preferences, in a low information environment in one-to-one matchings.
So¨nmez (1999) shows that there is no stable matching rule in hospital-intern
markets which is immune to manipulation via early contracting (unraveling)
between a hospital and a single intern.8 The paper most related to our study
is Mumcu and Saglam (2009), studying a similar problem between hospitals
and interns, though with some significant differences. Like ours, their model
considers two periods of matching, involving a regular market followed by an
aftermarket. Although the regular market can be treated as the ED period
in our model, students are not restricted to apply to one college (or to any
number of colleges for that matter) like in our model with ED. Therefore, the
negative result in Mumcu and Saglam (2009) about the nonmanipulability of
the matching systems by colleges through their quotas does not imply ours.
Moreover, the focus of Mumcu and Saglam (2009) is only manipulation (and
strategic games) in quotas while our paper also considers manipulation in
preferences.
The organization of the paper is as follows: Section 2 introduces the
model. Section 3 gives results on manipulability of matching systems. Finally
Section 4 concludes.
8Unraveling was previously studied by Roth and Xing (1994) showing that the in-
stability of matchings realized at the final date of transactions are neither necessary or
sufficient for the unraveling to occur. The two potential causes of unraveling are evolving
uncertainty and the exercise of market power.
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2 Model
We consider a college admission problem involving an early decision (ED)
market and a regular decision (RD) market. Formally, this problem is de-
noted by the list (C, S, q, qE, PR, PE) while the pairs (qE, PE) and (q, PR)
denote the ED market and the RD market, respectively. The first two com-
ponents of a college admission problem are non-empty, finite and disjoint
sets of colleges C and students S. The third component is a list of positive
natural numbers q = (qc)c∈C , where qc is the total capacity of college c. The
fourth component is a list of nonnegative natural numbers qE = (qEc )c∈C ,
where qEc ≤ qc denotes the quota of college c in the ED market. We define
for all q ∈ Nn+, the sets Q
E





E(q). The fifth component of a college admission problem is a list
of strict preference relations PR = (PRi )i∈C∪S where P
R
i denotes the strict
preference relation of individual i in the RD market. Finally, the last compo-
nent PE denotes a list of strict preference relations for colleges and students
in the ED market.
For any c ∈ C , PRc is a linear order on Σ
R
c = 2
S and PEc is a linear order
on some ΣEc ⊆ Σ
R
c such that ∅ ∈ Σ
E
c . Also, for any s ∈ S, P
R
s is a linear
order on ΣRs = {{c1}, {c2}, . . . , {cm}, ∅} and P
E
s is a linear order on some
ΣEs ⊆ Σ
R




s \{∅}| ≤ 1; i.e., each student can apply
to at most one college in the ED market.
Given any college c with a strict preference relation PRc , we can derive
its weak preference relation RRc , where sR
R
c s
′ for any s, s′ ∈ S if and only
if s PRc s
′ or s = s′. Analogously, given any student s with a strict pref-
erence relation PRs , we can derive his or her weak preference relation. We





























s ) to represent the strict and weak
preference of college c and student s over any two alternatives in the ED and
RD markets.
We assume that the ED preference PEc of any college c is consistent with
its RD preference PRc ; i.e., for any T, T






′.9 Likewise, we assume that for any s ∈ S, PEs is consistent with
PRs , i.e., for any c ∈ C we have c ≻
E
s ∅ only if c ≻
R
s ∅ and for any c, c
′ ∈ C
we have c ≻Es c
′ only if c ≻Rs c
′.
We also assume that PRc is responsive as in Roth (1985). That is, for all
S ′ ⊂ S it is true that
i) for all s ∈ S\S ′, S ′ ∪ {s} ≻Rc S
′ if and only if {s} ≻Rc ∅,
ii) for all s, s′ ∈ S\S ′ such that s 6= s′, S ′ ∪ {s} ≻Rc S
′ ∪ {s′} if and only
if {s} ≻Rc {s
′}.
Obviously, preferences of students over individual colleges are responsive.
Also note that preferences of both colleges and students in the ED market
become automatically responsive if their preferences are responsive in the RD
market, due to our assumption that the ED preferences must be consistent
with the RD preferences.
Let PRc and P
R
s respectively denote the set of all responsive preference
relations for college c and for student s in the RD market. Define PR =
×k∈C∪SP
R








c ) denote for college c the set
of all responsive preference relations, in the ED market, which are consistent








s ) denote for student s
the set of all responsive preference relations, in the ED market, which are
consistent with PRs . For any P














the class of all matching problems in the RD market. For any (q, PR) ∈
ER and qE ∈ QE(q), let us also define EE(q, PR, qE) = {qE} × PE(PR),





can be a proper subset of ΣR
c
, the consistency assumption does not prevent
college c from compromising in the ED market. For example, given a college admission
problem where S = {s1, s2}, C = {c1}, P
R
c1
= s1, s2, ∅, and P
E
c1
= s2, ∅, we should observe
that PE
c1
is consistent with PR
c1
even though c1 compromises in the ED market by not





A matching µE in the ED market (simply an ED matching) with the
quota profile qE is a function from the set C ∪ S into 2C∪S such that
i) for all s ∈ S, |µE(s)| ≤ 1 and µE(s) ⊆ C;
ii) for all c ∈ C, |µE(c)| ≤ qEc and µ
E(c) ⊆ S;
iii) for all (c, s) ∈ C × S, µE(s) = {c} if and only if s ∈ µE(c).
We denote the set of all ED matchings at qE by ME(qE). Let ME =
∪qE M
E(qE).




say that student s strictly prefers µE1 to µ
E







and weakly prefers µE1 to µ
E






2 (s). We do the same
for each college.
Given any ED matching µE and any capacity profile q, we define an RD
matching µR as a function from the set C ∪ S into 2C∪S such that
i) for all s ∈ S, |µR(s)| ≤ 1, and µE(s) ⊆ µR(s) ⊆ C;
ii) for all c ∈ C, |µR(c)| ≤ qc, and µ
E(c) ⊆ µR(c) ⊆ S;
iii) for all (c, s) ∈ C × S, µR(s) = {c} if and only if s ∈ µR(c).
The function µR preserves the early matchings achieved under µE, i.e.
early decisions are binding. Given (q, µE), we denote the set of all RD match-
ings by MR(q, µE). Let MR = ∪(q,µE)M
R(q, µE).
Given any two RD matchings µR1 and µ
R
2 , we say that student s strictly
prefers µR1 to µ
R















2 (s). We do the same for each college. For any
P ∈ PE∪PR, we let A(Pc) denote the set of all acceptable students for college
c at Pc, i.e., A(Pc) = {s ∈ S : s ≻c ∅}. Similarly, we let A(Ps) denote the set
of all acceptable colleges for student s at Ps, i.e., A(Ps) = {c ∈ C : c ≻s ∅}.
The choice of a college c from a group of students T ⊆ S in the ED





c , T ) = {T
′ ⊆ T ∩ A(PEc ) : |T






⊆ T ∩ A(PEc ) such that T
′′ 6= T ′ and |T
′′
| ≤ qEc }.
Similarly, given any ED matching µE, the choice of a college c from a
group of students T ⊆ S\µE(c) available for matching in the RD market
(q, PR) is defined as
ChRc (P
R
c , qc, µ
E, T ) = {T ′ ⊆ T ∩ A(PRc ) : |T
′| ≤ qc − |µ
E(c)| and
T ′ ∪ µE(c) ≻Rc T
′′
∪ µE(c) for all T
′′
⊆ T ∩ A(PRc )
such that T ′′ 6= T ′ and |T
′′
| ≤ qc − |µ
E(c)|}.
Given any qE, a matching µE ∈ ME(qE) is blocked by student s ∈ S if
∅ ≻Es µ






We say that µE is acceptable to a college, or to a student, that does not
block it. Also, µE is blocked by a college-student pair (c, s) ∈ C × S if
{c} ≻Es µ





E(c) ∪ {s}). We say that µE is
stable if it is not blocked by a student, a college, or a college-student pair.
Given an ED market (qE, PE), we denote the set of all stable ED matchings
by SE(qE, PE).
Given an ED matching µE, an RD matching µR ∈ MR(q, µE) is blocked
by student s ∈ S if ∅ ≻Rs µ
R(s)\µE(s) and blocked by college c ∈ C if
µR(c)\µE(c) 6= ChRc (P
R
c , qc, µ
E, µR(c)\µE(c)). We say that µR is acceptable
to a college, or to a student, that does not block it. Also, µR is blocked
by a college-student pair (c, s) ∈ C × S if µE(s) = ∅, {c} ≻Rs µ
R(s) and
µR(c)\µE(c) 6= ChRc (Pc, qc, µ
E, {s} ∪ µR(c)\µE(c)). We say that µR is stable
if it is not blocked by a student, a college, or a college-student pair. Given an
ED matching µE and an RD market (q, PR), we denote the set of all stable
RD matchings by SR((q, PR), µE).
We say that college c and student s are achievable for one another in the
ED market (qE, PE), if there is a stable ED matching in SE(qE, PE) at which
they are matched. Likewise, we define achievability in an RD market.
An ED matching rule is a function ϕE : EE →ME such that ϕE(qE, PE)
∈ME(qE) for every (qE, PE) ∈ EE. Let ϕ¯E denote the set of all ED matching
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rules. Similarly, an RD matching rule is a function ϕR : ER ×ME → MR
such that ϕR((q, PR), µE) ∈ MR(q, µE) for every (q, PR) ∈ ER, qE ∈ QE(q),
and µE ∈ME(qE). Let ϕ¯R denote the set of all RD matching rules.
An ED matching rule ϕE is stable if ϕE(qE, PE) ∈ SE(qE, PE) for every
(qE, PE) ∈ EE. On the other hand, an RD matching rule ϕR is stable at an
ED matching rule ϕE if ϕR((q, PR), ϕE(qE, PE)) ∈ SR((q, PR), ϕE(qE, PE))
for every (q, PR) ∈ ER and (qE, PE) ∈ EE(q, PR, qE).
Given any ED matching rule ϕE ∈ ϕ¯E and any RD matching rule ϕR ∈
ϕ¯R, the ordered pair (ϕE, ϕR) is called a matching system. A matching
system (ϕE, ϕR) is stable if ϕE is stable and ϕR is stable at ϕE.
A matching system (ϕE, ϕR) cannot be manipulated by individual k ∈
C ∪S via its ED preference if for all (q, PR) ∈ ER, (qE, PE) ∈ EE(q, PR, qE),




k ) it is true that
ϕR((q, PR), ϕE(qE, PE))(k) Rk ϕ
R((q, PR), ϕE(qE, PˆEk , P
E
−k))(k).
If the above holds for all colleges (students), then we say that the match-
ing system (ϕE, ϕR) is nonmanipulable by colleges (students) via ED prefer-
ences.
A matching system (ϕE, ϕR) cannot be manipulated by college c ∈ C
via its ED quota if for all (q, PR) ∈ ER, (qE, PE) ∈ EE(q, PR, qE), and
qˆEc ∈ Q
E
c (q) it is true that
ϕR((q, PR), ϕE(qE, PE))(c) Rc ϕ




If the above holds for all colleges, then we say that the matching system
(ϕE, ϕR) is nonmanipulable via ED quotas.
3 Results
Proposition 1. For any college admission problem with at least two colleges
and one student, there exists no matching system that is stable and nonma-
nipulable via ED quotas.
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Proof. We first consider a college admission problem (C, S, q, qE, PR, PE)
with two colleges and one student; i.e., C = {c1, c2} and S = {s1}. Let
qc1 = 1, qc2 = 1, q
E
c1












PRs1 = {c2}, {c1}, ∅;
PEs1 = {c1}, ∅.
(Note that the strict preference relation of a student or a college is repre-
sented by an ordered list of acceptable mates.) We have SE(qE, PE) = {µ1},




, PE) = {µ3}, and S


















Consider any matching system (ϕE, ϕR) that is stable. Then, we must
have ϕE(qE, PE) = µ1, ϕ




, PE) = µ3, and
ϕR((q, PR), µ3) = µ3. Hence,






ϕR((q, PR), ϕE(qE, PE))(c1).
So, college c1 can manipulate the matching system (ϕ
E, ϕR) via its ED quota
when qEc1 = 0. It can do so by announcing qˆ
E
c1
= 1 and accepting the unique
student s1 in the ED market. This completes the proof for the case of |C| = 2
and |S| = 1. In order to extend it to the general case of |C| ≥ 2 and |S| ≥ 1,
we can include, to the above college admission problem, colleges whose top
choice is admitting no student and students whose top choice is staying un-
matched both in the ED market and in the RD market. 
The proof of Proposition 1 suggests that a college may benefit from ad-
mitting students both in the ED market and in the RD market, when the rest
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of the colleges, or a sufficient number of them, consider admission only in the
RD market. Naturally, Proposition 1 is not valid when there exists a unique
college in the admission problem. In that case, a unique stable matching
exists for the RD market (and for the ED market), and this stable matching
is college-optimal (and also student-optimal), i.e., the unique college would
be matched to the highest-ranked achievable students allowed by its quota.
Thus, a college that faces no rivals cannot improve the quality of its matches
in the RD market (which is already optimal), by changing its quota for the
ED market (or by allocating/not allocating some of its total capacity to the
ED market). The presence of an ED market would offer an unrivaled college
only the opportunity to run and complete its admission process at an earlier
time than planned for the RD market.
Next, we consider whether colleges have incentives to manipulate their
ED preferences.
Proposition 2. For any college admission problem with at least two colleges
and one student, there exists no matching system that is stable and nonma-
nipulable by colleges via ED preferences.
Proof. We first consider a college admission problem (C, S, q, qE, PR, PE)
with two colleges and one student; i.e., C = {c1, c2} and S = {s1}. Let
qc1 = 1, qc2 = 1, q
E
c1
= 1, qEc2 = 0;
















Then, we have SE(qE, PE) = {µ1}, S
R(q, PR, µ1) = {µ2}, S























Consider any matching system (ϕE, ϕR) that is stable. Then, we must
have ϕE(qE, PE) = µ1, ϕ
R((q, PR), µ1) = µ2, ϕ
E(qE, PˆEc1 , P
E
−c1
) = µ3, and
ϕR((q, PR), µ3) = µ3. Hence,






ϕR((q, PR), ϕE(qE, PE))(c1).
So, college c1 can manipulate the matching system (ϕ
E, ϕR) via its ED pref-
erence, completing the proof for the case of |C| = 2 and |S| = 1. In order to
extend it to the general case of |C| ≥ 2 and |S| ≥ 1, we can include, to the
above college admission problem, colleges whose top choice is admitting no
student and students whose top choice is staying unmatched both in the ED
market and in the RD market. 
Below, we finally consider manipulation of matching systems by students.
Proposition 3. For any college admission problem with at least two colleges
and one student, there exists no matching system that is stable and nonma-
nipulable by students via ED preferences.
Proof. We first consider a college admission problem (C, S, q, qE, PR, PE)
with two colleges and one student; i.e., C = {c1, c2} and S = {s1}. Let
qc1 = 1, qc2 = 1, q
E
c1









PRs1 = {c1}, {c2}, ∅;
PEs1 = {c2}, ∅;
PˆEs1 = {c1}, ∅.
We have SE(qE, PE) = {µ1}, S
R(q, PR, µ1) = {µ1}, S























Consider any matching system (ϕE, ϕR) that is stable. Then, we must
have ϕE(qE, PE) = µ1, ϕ
R((q, PR), µ1) = µ1, ϕ
E(qE, PˆEs1 , P
E
−s1
) = µ2, and
ϕR((q, PR), µ2) = µ3. Hence,






ϕR((q, PR), ϕE(qE, PE))(s1).
So, student s1 can manipulate the matching system (ϕ
E, ϕR) via his or her
ED preference, completing the proof for the case of |C| = 2 and |S| = 1.
In order to extend it to the general case of |C| ≥ 2 and |S| ≥ 1, we can
include, to the above college admission problem, colleges whose top choice
is admitting no student and students whose top choice is staying unmatched
both in the ED market and in the RD market. 
Neither Proposition 2 nor Proposition 3 are valid when there exists a
unique college in the admission problem (for the same reason as we stated
after Proposition 1). In that case, a unique stable matching could exist in the
RD market, and this matching would be both college-optimal and student-
optimal, eliminating any incentives for manipulation by colleges or students.
4 Conclusions
Many colleges and universities in the United Stated may have strong incen-
tives to continue their early decision programs as they can manipulate the
admission and matriculation rate by means of these programs, which in turn
determine the rankings of these institutions that students take into account
when applying.10 As a matter of fact, liberal arts colleges are argued to rely
on early decision (and early action) programs much more than larger uni-
versities because small miscalculations about class size can have much more
serious consequences than at larger institutions.11 These arguments suggest
that the intertemporal quota allocation may be an important reason behind
10See Avery et.al. (2004).
11See page 274 of Avery et.al. (2003).
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the adoption of ED programs. While the existing ED programs have been
invented, to some extent, to strategically manipulate the outcome of the reg-
ular admission programs, even the ED programs, or the combinations of ED
and RD programs, are prone to the manipulation of colleges (for example, via
their quotas and preferences) and students (via their preferences), as shown
by our results in this paper. Using a two period matching model with an
ED market followed by an RD market, we have established that (i) there
exists no stable matching system which is nonmanipulable via ED quotas
by colleges (Proposition 1) and (ii) there exists no stable matching system
which is nonmanipulable via ED preferences by colleges or students (Propo-
sitions 2 and 3, respectively). Interestingly, Proposition 1 suggests that it
may not (always) be possible to eliminate strategic incentives of colleges to
manipulate the existing college admission system by controlling or changing
the (stable) matching rules followed in the ED and RD markets.
We should note here that we have modeled the college admission problem
using a many-to-one matching setup in two periods, separating the early and
regular decision markets in time dimension as in reality. An alternative, and
much richer, model was very recently introduced by Yenmez (2018), who
showed that college admissions with early and non-early decisions can be
operated by a centralized clearinghouse that can deal with stable many-to-
many matchings with contracts between colleges and students. We believe
that one can fruitfully study whether our negative results as to the nonma-
nipulability of stable matching rules could also arise in the alternative model
of Yenmez (2018).
Another important question that we leave for future research is why some
colleges in the United States use only regular decision programs while others
also offer at least one type of early admission program. Related to this
question, we wonder whether the observed heterogeneity in the attitudes of
colleges over the use, and the selection, of early admission programs can
be sustained as an equilibrium behavior in a college admission game where
colleges can strategically decide which early admission programs to offer given
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their beliefs about the choices of others. In case such an equilibrium exists
and can be characterized in terms of the parameters of the college admission
system, one can also study whether or how it could be improved by policy
makers to the benefit of students and/or colleges.
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